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A veto of the European Parliament against ACTA would
be a way for MEPs to reassert themselves against
member states.
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Recent months have seen protests across Europe against the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (ACTA), which seeks to protect intellectual property. Valentin
Kreilinger argues that the European Parliament now has an opportunity to take into
account the views of Europe’s citizens and veto the agreement, meaning that the
agreement would have to be renegotiated.
At the end of March, the International Trade Committee of the European Parliament
decided not to refer the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) to the Court of
Justice, but to have the plenary vote on the agreement as initially foreseen, probably in June 2012.
ACTA’s objective is to protect intellectual property against classical counterfeiting (clothing,
pharmaceuticals) as well as digital counterfeiting (illegal downloads) on the basis of harmonized
international norms. Contracting parties are Australia, Canada, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand,
Singapore, South Korea, the United States and the European Union.
ACTA was negotiated outside the World Trade Organization (traditionally the forum for these sorts of
agreements) between 2007 and 2010. In early 2012, tens of thousands of people gathered in
numerous European cities to protest against ACTA. Several Member States reacted by halting their
national ratification procedures and the European Commission asked the Court of Justice to issue an
opinion. The European Parliament has veto power over the agreement and could prevent its entry-into-
force.
The European Parliament can approve or not approve agreements like ACTA, it has a ‘take it or leave
it’ option; International Agreements, for which co-decision or consent procedures apply to internal EU
legislation, require the consent of the Parliament. According to the treaties, the Council:
shall adopt a decision concluding the agreement […] after obtaining the consent of
the European Parliament in the following cases […] agreements covering a field to
which the ordinary legislative procedure applies (Article 218(6) TFEU).
Consequently, post-Lisbon a higher
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Consequently, post-Lisbon a higher
number of International Agreements
fall under the consent procedure.
The Council decides by qualified
majority or unanimous voting (as in
the case of ACTA; see Article
207(4) TFEU for the provision
concerning trade agreements). If an
agreement is a ‘mixed agreement’
that covers competences at the
national and European level,
national parliaments must also ratify
the agreement. Trade
Commissioner Karel De Gucht
asked in 2010: ‘Do we really need
27 additional national ratifications
when the European Parliament can
now exercise parliamentary scrutiny
over these agreements?’
In February 2010, the first version of
the SWIFT agreement (Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on
the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States
for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program) was rejected by the European Parliament.
This vote – that took place two years ago – has three effects for ACTA:
It makes the threat of a veto credible;
It shows the main condition for a veto: the European Parliament must be hesitant for ideological
reasons and prefer the status quo to the proposed International Agreement; and
It proves that the European Parliament can obtain concessions when an agreement is
renegotiated.
Whether a majority will actually withhold consent to ACTA depends on the position of the Liberals: If the
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) votes with the centre-left, the agreement will
probably fail. If ALDE votes with the centre-right, it will probably pass. Of course, there might also be
significant defections from the political groups. Let us imagine a veto by the European Parliament:
What would happen then? Can this multinational agreement be renegotiated? Each of the Contracting
Parties has a couple of veto players; the European Union has about 55 (if we count two chambers of
the national parliament per Member State and the European Parliament). One ‘solution’ might be to
split the relatively uncontroversial part on classical counterfeiting into a separate agreement, but can
any such agreement achieve its objectives, when countries like China are not Contracting Parties?
If ACTA has the objective to prevent counterfeiting across the world and across all sectors, it is difficult
to understand why it was negotiated outside of the WTO and with only developed countries as
contracting parties (a couple of WTO members also expressed various concerns). If the European
Parliament wants to reassert itself against Member States that are increasingly acting in an
intergovernmental way and not along the lines of the “Community method”, this might be an occasion to
demonstrate power. If the views of the citizens are taken into account in the EU, the anti-ACTA
movement cannot be ignored. Three key reasons for the European Parliament not to approve the
agreement, each a strong reason in and of itself.
In parallel with the legislative process, the European Parliament should engage in dialogue with
national parliaments of EU member states and with other Contracting Parties – in order to prevent
being branded as the ‘no’ institution. Influence exercised in this way before the conclusion of
agreements would help to avoid the situation of cases like SWIFT and ACTA in the future. The 2010
inter-institutional agreement between the Commission and the Parliament, which has been contested
by the Council, is not just a piece of paper! The Commission and the Council must recognise the
powers of the European Parliament in day-to-day business.
This is now a case where the European Parliament faces a difficult choice: to harm the international
‘actorness’ of the EU, if it says no – or to harm the inter-institutional ‘standing’ of the Parliament in EU
Foreign Policy making, if it bites the bullet. Both are long-term goals of the European Parliament, but
veto power exists in order to be used.
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